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plans in for-profit companies is 
difficult enough. But, as I have 
noted in these pages previously, 
it can be even more difficult 
in not-for-profit organizations 
because the mission or bottom 
line may be more difficult to 
ar t iculate (see the May 2012 
Research for the Real World 
column, “Governance and Execu-
tive Compensation in Nonprofits” 
and the April 2013 column, “Pay in Nonprofits”). But what 
about religious organizations? Would such plans actually 
work? Are there potential unintended consequences?
Pay, Performance and Sector
Paying leaders of for-profit organizations is difficult. And this 
is even the case when there is some agreement regarding 
the objectives of the organizations (e.g., returns to share-
holders in publicly held companies). But as we step away 
from the most obvious objective of maximizing shareholder 
return or profit, things can get more complicated.
What is the objective of a major league sports team? Is 
it to maximize wins, or profit, or both? And if they take 
their eye off the ball (or puck) of either, do they fail at 
both? What about a not-for-profit nursing home? Does it, for 
example, aim to extend residents’ lives, provide quality-of-
life care, maximize the lifespan of the organization itself, 
create “profit” to be put to other noble causes in the future, 
or something else altogether? And once the objective is 
determined, can compensation plans be structured to pay 
for performance to this end? If the pay plan is designed to 
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motivate and/or reward a leader of this nursing home to 
fulfill the objective(s), are there unintended consequences?
In this regard, how can pay of religious leaders be consid-
ered, given these organizations may have a mission going 
beyond maximization of profits. Surely, some will argue that 
many leaders of religious organizations are called to do the 
work they do and are likely giving up substantial amounts 
of money in order to do that work (the same can be said of 
leaders of all sorts of not-for-profits). But, leaving aside how 
much religious leaders are paid, it is interesting to think 
about how they are paid.
A Study of Religious Leaders 
Three authors shed considerable light on this by using a 
rich data set of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers over 
43 years. To be sure, the data are from one specific religious 
group in one region of the United States, but the data are 
absolutely extraordinary. In “Is a Higher Calling Enough? 
Incentive Compensation in the Church,” Journal of Labor 
Economics, 28(3), 2010, 509-539, authors Jay C. Hartzell, 
Christopher A. Parsons and David L. Yermack consider 
pay and productivity with this unique dataset. I will only 
mention a few of their interesting findings.
The data include information on 727 United Methodist 
Churches in the Midwest (2,201 unique ministers) for each 
year from 1961-2003, data on minister salary, congrega-
tion membership, attendance, revenue, members added 
and multiple reasons for members added (e.g., from other 
Methodist churches, from other Christian churches and new 
conversions to Christianity).
The authors are fundamentally interested in whether 
there is pay for performance for ministers in the data. 
They recognize that this is potentially an unusual place to 
find evidence of such incentives because folks are likely 
intrinsically “called” to be ministers, and pay may not be 
an immediate factor in accepting this kind of recruitment 
call. They also recognize that having incentive contracts 
for religious leaders might hamper credibility among the 
parishioners. They do not seek to see whether there is, for 
example, language in minister contracts that links pay and 
performance. Rather, they explore the data in an attempt 
to find relationships that may be consistent with pay for 
performance, regardless of whether such incentives are 
purposely devised.
One finding of this study: Just as in many other forms of 
executive compensation, there is a strong link between pay 
and organization size for this group of ministers. Control-
ling for other factors, the authors found that when a new 
member joins a church, the minister, on average, would see 
annual pay go up about $15. And when a member leaves, 
an average minister’s annual pay goes down about $7. Seen 
another way, the authors document that, controlling for 
other factors, “a pastor is paid close to 3 percent of the 
incremental revenue that accrues to the church when a new 
member joins” (p. 511).
Economists like to calculate “elasticities.” An elasticity 
is the percentage increase in one thing that happens in 
response to a 1 percent increase in another. Here, the 
authors calculate and present the “elasticity of pay with 
respect to organization size.” They find that as the size of a 
church increases by 1 percent, on average the minister’s pay 
would increase about one-fifth of 1 percent, or an elasticity 
of about 0.2. In other words, doubling the congregation size 
correlates with a 20 percent increase in the average annual 
salary. The equivalent number for for-profit CEOs in the 
United States is between 0.3 and 0.4 (p. 525).
They go on to consider many other issues, such as 
whether the return for “poaching” members from neigh-
boring congregations of their own faith is lower than for 
recruiting converts from other faiths (it is) and whether 
ministers are compensated for risk. With respect to the 
latter, they find lower pay-for-performance sensitivity in 
parishes where church revenue is highly volatile, such as 
some regions of Oklahoma where church revenue fluctu-
ates with oil prices.
Paying Religious Leaders and 
Leaders of For-Profits
It is striking that the lessons learned from even a specific 
set of leaders in one specific religious group has lessons 
that could be applied to the compensation on leaders in 
all sorts of workplaces. Pay, performance, risk, incentives, 
organization structure and compensation are linked in a 
dizzying array within most organizations. I expect I’ll be 
thinking about this the next time I happen to be listening 
to a Sunday-morning sermon. 
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